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Abstract 
 
We find that local analyst recommendations are systematically more optimistic than foreign 
analyst recommendations in emerging markets. The effects of this novel “home bias” among 
local analysts overwhelm any information asymmetry between foreign and local analysts. 
Consequently, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades, while local analyst 
downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades. Neither foreign investors, local institutions, 
nor retail investors appear to be fully cognizant of this bias. Trade reactions suggest that foreign 
investors overestimate the bias in foreign analyst recommendations while local institutions 
underestimate the bias in local analyst recommendations. These results are pervasive across 
countries, time periods, and stock groupings, and can be traced to investment banking pressure. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 The financial press in developed markets is rife with reports of conflicts of interests 
among sell-side analysts. For example, “Did Wall Street Really Learn Its Lesson?,” which 
appeared in The New York Times on April 9, 2006, challenges the view that the high profile 
investigations in 2001 led by New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer have curtailed the 
tendency of sell-side analysts to issue optimistic recommendation reports. Yet, in emerging 
markets, such as Asia, one finds scant anecdotal evidence of analyst conflicts of interests. A 
search of the global database Factiva over the past two years (2005 and 2006) yields only one 
article1 on the recommendation bias of analysts in the region. Therefore, there seems to be less 
focus on conflicts of interests among analysts in emerging markets. Yet, the underlying drivers 
behind analyst optimism, such as investment banking pressure,2 may be stronger with local 
analysts than with foreign analysts in these markets. For example, articles such as “Funds Raised 
by Taiwan’s Firms via Banks,” which appeared in Taiwan Economic News on July 6, 2006, and 
“DBS Still Tops in Capital Markets Here,” from The Business Times Singapore on January 9, 
2006, suggest that local underwriters dominate in the region. Hence, the analysts working for 
these local underwriters may be even more optimistic than their foreign counterparts. 
 This paper sheds light on the recommendation biases of local and foreign analysts on 
emerging market stocks. Using data from eight emerging Asian countries3 between 1994 and 
2003, we find that domestic equity issues in emerging Asian markets are dominated by local 
underwriters. In every country, at least 78% (by number) and 69% (by market capitalization) of 
the equity issues are managed by local underwriters. To the extent that this is symptomatic of 
cultural and language barriers facing foreign underwriters or of the less lucrative nature of 
underwriting in emerging countries, it suggests that local analysts face much stronger investment 
banking pressures than do foreign analysts in these markets. We then test for systematic 
differences in recommendation optimism between local and foreign analysts. If, as argued by 
                                                 
1 The search was based on the keyword phrase “asia and analysts and investment banking and bias.” The article, 
“Analyzing the Analysts – Brokerages Get Screened,” from The Business Times Singapore on January 4, 2005, 
noted that there was “an institutional bias towards buy recommendations.” 
2 The agency issue here is that because sell-side analysts work for investment banks and brokerage houses, they may 
feel pressured to generate optimistic recommendations to support their firms’ efforts in securing the next equity 
issue (see Michael and Womack (2005) for further discussion). 
3 These countries include India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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Michaely and Womack (1999) and others, investment banking pressures are responsible for sell-
side analyst recommendation optimism, then we should observe greater optimism among local 
analysts. We find that the difference in optimism between local and foreign analyst 
recommendations is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 14.00). In addition, it is 
robust across countries and time-periods, and pervasive across small, large, value, growth, index, 
and non-index stocks. 
  Next, we compare the post-announcement returns of local versus foreign analyst 
recommendations. If investment banking pressure is the main driver behind differences in local 
and foreign analyst recommendations, then we should observe that local upgrades underperform 
foreign upgrades while local downgrades outperform foreign downgrades. On the other hand, if 
foreigners are the smarter players in emerging markets, as advanced in Seasholes (2006) and 
Richards (2005), foreign analyst upgrades and downgrades should outperform local analyst 
upgrades and downgrades. Conversely, the reverse should prevail if local informational 
advantages dominate in emerging markets (Dvorak (2005) and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005)). 
We find that the difference in recommendation optimism translates to differences in 
announcement day returns. Foreign analyst buy recommendations reliably outperform local 
analyst buy recommendations by 24 basis points (t-statistic = 3.82) on the announcement day. 
Conversely, local analyst sell recommendations reliably outperform foreign analyst sell 
recommendations by -22 basis points (t-statistic = -2.18) on the announcement day. Similar 
results are obtained with upgrades and downgrades.  
 To examine long-term recommendation performance, we adopt a calendar time portfolio 
approach and show that after controlling for return covariation with the Fama and French (1993) 
three factors, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades by 3 basis points per 
day or 7.2% annualized, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades 
by -5.9 basis points per day or -14.2% annualized. These results echo those of Barber, Lehavy, 
and Trueman (2006), who find that analysts facing greater investment banking pressure, i.e., 
those working for investment banks, generate upgrades (downgrades) that are less (more) 
informative than analysts facing less investment banking pressure, i.e., those working for 
independent research firms. The results also indicate that the recommendation performance 
differences that we observe cannot be simply traced to smarter foreign analysts or to a local 
informational advantage. 
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 To further investigate the link between investment banking pressure and the difference in 
recommendation optimism between local and foreign analysts, we test whether controlling for 
underwriter affiliation, the optimism difference is increasing in the aggregate investment banking 
deal flow and in the proportion of that flow directed toward underwriters from the country where 
the analyst is based. We find that local analysts are even more optimistic than foreign analysts 
when the local equity issue market is hot or when many investment banking deals are managed 
by local underwriters. Variation in these country-specific investment banking proxies can 
completely explain away optimism differences between local and foreign analysts. In contrast, 
other explanations, including the view that local analysts are under greater pressure to generate 
commissions (Jackson (2005)), that foreign analysts cover stocks with greater institutional 
presence which in turn serves as a disciplining device (Ljungqvist et al. (2006)), that foreign 
analysts have better reputations to safeguard (Stickel (1992)), that foreign analysts shade their 
recommendations to account for currency and country risk, that familiarity bias breeds greater 
optimism among locals (Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2006)), and that local analysts suffer from the 
selection (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)) and cognitive biases (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)) 
induced by underwriter affiliation, do not account for the bulk of the optimism differences.4 
 To gauge the ability of investors to unravel the recommendation optimism of local and 
foreign analysts, we evaluate the trade reaction of local retail investors, local institutions, and 
foreign investors to analyst recommendation announcements. Given our announcement day 
return results, if investors recognize the full extent of the bias in analyst recommendations, they 
should sell more following local analyst sells/downgrades than they buy following local analyst 
buys/upgrades. Conversely, they should buy more following foreign analyst buys/upgrades than 
they sell following foreign analyst sells/downgrades. Moreover, they should buy more after 
foreign analyst buys than after local analyst buys, and sell more after local analyst sells than after 
foreign analyst sells.  
 Using daily trade data from the Korea Stock Exchange, we find that while foreign 
investors and local institutions aggressively trade in the correct direction following analyst 
recommendation announcements, they do not fully appreciate the difference in optimism 
between local and foreign analysts. Foreign investors trade incorrectly as if foreign analyst 
                                                 
4 For instance, analysts from the Institutional Investor All-Asia teams are more optimistic than other analysts, which 
is inconsistent with the reputation story in which the better reputation of foreign analysts drives the lower levels of 
optimism among foreign analysts. 
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sells/downgrades are more informative than foreign analyst buys/upgrades. In response to 
foreign analyst sells, foreign investors sell 2.23 times as much as they buy following foreign 
analyst buys. They also sell more following a foreign sell than following a local sell, despite the 
fact that the latter conveys more negative information. Local institutions trade incorrectly as if 
local analyst buys are more informative than local analyst sells. In response to local analyst buys, 
local institutions buy 1.48 times as much as they sell following local analyst sells.  They also buy 
more following a local buy than following a foreign buy. In short, foreign investors overestimate 
the bias in foreign analyst recommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in 
local analyst recommendations. Our trade reaction results, which are based on Korean daily trade 
data, challenge the Morgan Stanley view (The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1992) that 
sophisticated investors are able to unravel and correctly assess the investment banking pressures 
of sell-side analysts, and dovetail with the view that investors do not fully recognize the bias in 
analyst research and are systematically misled by analyst reports.  
 This paper contributes to the literature by documenting optimism differences between 
local and foreign analysts in emerging markets and linking those differences to investment 
banking pressure. While there is a nascent body of work on international analysts, these studies 
mainly test for accuracy differences between local and foreign analyst forecasts and 
recommendations (see Orpurt (2006), Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006), Bacmann and Bolliger (2006), 
and Chang (2006)). None of these papers focus on the optimism differences between local and 
foreign recommendations, or on the drivers of those differences. Unlike those papers, ours 
uncovers a “home bias”5 or a greater tendency to issue optimistic recommendations among local 
analysts than among foreign analysts. This study also shows that agency issues related to 
analysts’ incentives to attract underwriting business are an important phenomenon in Asian as 
well as in U.S. markets. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of 
the related literature and data. Section 3 reports the empirical findings while Section 4 discusses 
the results in light of several competing explanations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
5 This “home bias” is reminiscent of but distinct from the traditional home bias, i.e., the preference displayed by 
international investors for local stocks, documented by French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and 
Tesar and Wermer (1995).  
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II. Methodology 
 
A. Related Literature 
 
 The link between investment banking and analyst recommendation optimism is 
reasonably well established in developed markets. For example, Lin and McNichols (1998) 
report that lead underwriter U.S. analysts issue more favorable recommendations than 
unaffiliated U.S. analysts. Moreover, the three-day returns of the hold recommendations issued 
by the former are significantly more negative than those issued by the latter. Along the same 
lines, Michaely and Womack (1999) report that, in the U.S., initial public offerings (henceforth 
IPOs) for which underwriter analysts issue buy recommendations underperform IPOs with buy 
recommendations from only unaffiliated analysts. This supports the view that underwriters 
attempt to boost the stock prices of the firms they have taken public. Similarly, Barber, Lehavy, 
and Trueman (2006) find that upgrades from U.S. investment banks underperform upgrades from 
independent U.S. research firms, while the reverse is true for downgrades. They ascribe their 
results to the greater investment banking pressures facing investment banks.  
 Investment banking relationships notwithstanding, other factors may also influence 
analyst optimism. Jackson (2005), using data from Australia, argues that the pressure to generate 
brokerage commissions can induce optimism among sell-side analysts.  Ljungqvist et al. (2006) 
contend that the presence of institutional investors moderates conflicts of interest in sell-side 
research and show that U.S. analysts issue less optimistic recommendations for U.S. stocks with 
high institutional ownership.  Stickel (1992) finds that reputable All-American analysts deliver 
more accurate forecasts than other analysts. Hence, reputable analysts may eschew optimism for 
greater accuracy. Finally, affiliated analysts may be more biased simply because firms select 
underwriters who are more optimistic (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)) or because affiliated 
analysts genuinely believe that the firms their banks underwrite are superior to firms 
underwritten by competing banks (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)). 
 In contrast to the large literature on analyst conflicts of interests in developed markets, 
little is known about such conflicts of interest in emerging markets. Most papers on international 
analysts focus instead on explaining the international home bias puzzle or the strong preference 
for local stocks among international investors (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis 
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(1994), Tesar and Werner (1995)). One possibility for the home bias is that a local informational 
advantage exists. However, the extant literature on international investors offers mixed evidence. 
For instance, Dovrak (2005), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), and Hau (2001) report that local 
investors outperform foreign investors in Indonesia, Korea, and Germany, respectively. Yet, 
Seasholes (2006), Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001), and Richards (2005) show that 
foreign investors outperform, especially in emerging markets. 
 Adding to this debate, studies on international analysts mainly test for accuracy 
differences between local and foreign analyst earnings forecasts. Orpurt (2006) finds that local 
analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts in Europe. Consistent with 
this, Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006) demonstrate in their sample of 32 countries that local analysts 
issue superior earnings forecasts, especially in emerging countries where there is less 
informational disclosure. Conversely, Bacmann and Bolliger (2006) show that foreign analyst 
forecasts outperform local analyst forecasts in Latin American countries. Taking the middle 
ground, Chang (2006) reports that in Taiwan, foreign analysts with local presence issue 
recommendations that outperform those issued by local and other foreign analysts. None of these 
papers contribute to our understanding of the conflicts of interest issues facing analysts in 
emerging countries, however.  
 
B. Data 
 
 We cull analyst recommendations data from the I/B/E/S Detail and Summary 
Recommendation files. Our sample covers eight Asian emerging countries – India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand – and extends from January 1994 
to December 2003. Our choice of eight emerging Asian markets reflects the belief that emerging 
Asian markets are on average larger than emerging Latin American or East European markets, 
and they offer a longer time series and wider cross-section of local and foreign analyst 
recommendations with which to maximize the power of the tests. Recent studies that focus on 
emerging Asian countries include Dvorak (2005), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), Barber, Lee, Liu, 
and Odean (2006), and Richards (2005). 
 In I/B/E/S, the Detail Recommendations file provides a data entry for each 
recommendation announcement by each sell-side analyst whose brokerage firm contributes to 
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the database. I/B/E/S parlays the original text recommendations to its own five-point rating 
system, i.e., 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform), and 5 (sell).  Unlike in the U.S., 
where the five-point rating scheme is widely used, the three-point rating scheme is popular 
among analysts in international markets. Many international analysts rate firms with a buy, hold, 
or sell recommendation. In such cases, I/B/E/S maps them to 1, 3, and 5, respectively, in their 
five-point rating system. Hence, considerably fewer buy and underperform recommendations are 
found in our sample compared to the U.S. sample.6 To make the comparison of 
recommendations meaningful across analysts, we aggregate I/B/E/S ratings 1 and 2 as buy, and 4 
and 5 as sell throughout the study. Also, to facilitate the interpretation of our results, we assign 
the values 1, 2, and 3 to sell, hold, and buy recommendations, respectively.7 
 The I/B/E/S Summary file provides a monthly summary for each firm covered in the 
database, with the number of outstanding ratings and the mean and the median of those ratings 
available on a monthly basis. We measure recommendation optimism as the difference between 
an analyst’s recommendation and the current month’s median consensus for the firm. The results 
using the mean consensus are virtually identical. Our regression analysis on recommendation 
optimism excludes recommendations with consensus levels generated from less than three 
recommendations. We do so because consensus levels generated from few recommendations are 
noisy and may not be representative of consensus belief among analysts. We classify each 
brokerage firm as either local or foreign depending on the location of the firm’s headquarters. 
For each stock traded in country x, a brokerage firm is classified as local if it is headquartered in 
country x. It is classified as foreign otherwise. We obtain the headquarter information for each 
brokerage firm by hand from stock exchanges, securities and exchange commissions, and 
company websites8.   
                                                 
6 Of the analyst recommendations in our eight-country universe, the proportion of strong buys, buys, holds, 
underperforms, and sells are 32%, 14%, 31%, 7%, and 16%, respectively. In the U.S., however, the corresponding 
proportions are 27%, 34%, 34%, 3%, and 2%, respectively, during the sample period. Clearly, there is a dearth of 
buys and underperforms in the I/B/E/S emerging market stock universe. 
7 Our results are robust to using the five-point rating system in place of the three-point rating system. 
8 The Jakarta Stock Exchange, Philippine Stock Exchange, and Singapore Monetary Authority provide a 
comprehensive list of brokerage firms that conduct business in the respective countries, including business and 
address information. In addition, we use information on the exchange member lists obtained from other stock 
exchanges and information on company websites to distinguish local from foreign brokerages. 
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 We employ daily return data from Datastream to examine the returns from following 
local and foreign analyst recommendations.9 We adjust for market returns using the daily 
Datastream total market indices for each country. Further, we match firms in I/B/E/S with those 
in Datastream using the I/B/E/S ticker symbol. Datastream only maintains a list of I/B/E/S ticker 
symbols for firms that are currently covered by I/B/E/S. For those firms in Datastream that are 
no longer covered by I/B/E/S, we manually match those using company names. We are able to 
match 91% of the firms in our I/B/E/S universe. The unmatched firms account for roughly 5% of 
the recommendations in our sample. Excluding them, we are left with 139,504 recommendations. 
[please insert Table 1 here] 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics from our analyst recommendations data. Panel A 
reports the statistics for local and foreign analyst groups by country over the entire sample 
period. Panel B reports the statistics by subperiod. A few points are noteworthy. First, the eight 
emerging Asian markets have garnered substantial interest from foreign analysts. There are 74 
foreign brokerages over the entire sample period, which is about two-thirds of the number of 
local brokerages. However, the ratio of the number of local to foreign brokerages has increased 
over the sample period, reflecting the expansion of the local brokerage industry in these 
countries. Second, foreign brokerages cover more firms than local brokerages in the early years, 
but the trend has reversed in the recent years. On average, the firms covered by foreign 
brokerages are smaller than those covered by locals in the early years but are larger in the recent 
years. Third, foreign brokerages are substantially larger than local brokerages. The number of 
analysts working for foreign brokerages worldwide typically exceeds 100, while that for local 
brokerages is typically fewer than 30.  Fourth, foreign brokerages are responsible for the bulk of 
the analyst recommendations in this region, but the proportion of the recommendations issued by 
local analysts has increased over the sample period.  
 To control for underwriter affiliation in our tests, we also use SDC equity issue data, 
which include managing underwriter(s), value of shares issued, issue price, and date of listing 
information, to generate country-specific investment banking proxies and to determine 
underwriter affiliation. In addition, we supplement the SDC data with IPO data from the Korean 
                                                 
9 We use both the active and inactive stock files from Datastream to mitigate survivorship bias. In view of the 
practice that Datastream sets the return as a constant after a stock ceases trading, we treat those constant values as 
missing values in the inactive data file. In addition, to avoid recording errors in Datastream, we treat daily holding 
period returns that are greater than 100% as missing values.  
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Stock Exchange, KOSDAQ, the Singapore Stock Exchange, the Philippine Stock Exchange, and 
Bursa Malaysia.  
 Finally, to investigate how investors react to analyst recommendations, we collect daily 
trading data for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. We are not able to obtain trading data 
for the other seven countries because they are not publicly available. The advantage of the 
Korean dataset is that it allows us to unambiguously distinguish trades by investor type and 
thereby examine their trade reactions to analyst recommendations. The exchange labels investors 
as (1) securities companies, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment trusts, (4) banks, (5) other 
finance companies, (6) funds, (7) individuals, (8) foreigners, or (9) others. For our purposes, we 
aggregate the first six types of investors and refer to them as domestic institutions. We refer to 
(7) as domestic retail investors and (8) as foreign investors, and we ignore (9).  The Korean daily 
trading data are only available from January 1, 1995 onward.  
 As a prelude to analyzing analyst recommendations, we report the number and total 
market capitalization of domestic equity issues in the eight emerging countries grouped by 
managing underwriter location in Table A1 of the Appendix. An equity issue is classified as 
“local lead underwriter” if the sole managing underwriter is local or if all the joint managing 
underwriters are local. It is classified as “foreign lead underwriter” otherwise. From Table A1, 
we confirm that domestic equity issues in emerging Asian markets are dominated by local 
underwriters.  In every country, at least 78% (by number) and 69% (by market capitalization) of 
the equity issues are managed by local underwriters. The equity issue market is least dominated 
by local underwriters in Indonesia (possibly reflecting the underdeveloped local investment 
banking sector) and most dominated by local underwriters in Taiwan. The results in Table A1 
indicate that emerging market equity issues are typically managed by local underwriters. This, in 
turn, points to the presence of cultural and language barriers facing foreign underwriters or to the 
less lucrative nature of underwriting in emerging countries. It also suggests that local analysts 
face greater investment banking pressures than do foreign analysts in these markets  
 
III. Empirical Tests 
 
 In this section we explore optimism differences between local and foreign analyst 
recommendations. Our analysis is motivated by the dominance of local underwriters in the equity 
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issue markets in emerging countries. The dominance suggests that local analysts face stronger 
conflicts of interests than do foreign analysts. Hence, we hypothesize that local analyst 
recommendations are more optimistic than foreign analyst recommendations on emerging market 
stocks. In addition, such optimism differences may translate to differences in recommendation 
performance. Specifically, because local analysts are more eager to issue upgrades and more 
reluctant to issue downgrades, local upgrades should underperform foreign upgrades, while local 
downgrades should outperform foreign downgrades. Moreover, if international investors are not 
fully aware of such optimism differences, then they may have implications on international 
investor performance as well.  
 
A.  Recommendation Optimism: Local versus Foreign Analysts 
 
 The first order of business is to test for optimism differences between local and foreign 
analysts. We first examine the distribution of analyst recommendations. We report the number 
and proportion of analyst recommendations and recommendation changes for both local and 
foreign analysts in Table 2. We also test the null hypothesis that the differences in proportion are 
each equal to zero (assuming that all recommendations result from independent decisions). The 
recommendation level results in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that local analysts, relative to 
foreign analysts, appear to be more reluctant to issue sells than they are eager to issue buys and 
holds. The difference in proportion between local and foreign analyst recommendations is 
positive for buys and holds, but negative for sells. These differences are statistically different 
from zero at the 1% level of significance.10 We note, however, that the larger differences in 
proportion for holds and sells, versus buys, suggest that local analysts are more reluctant to issue 
pessimistic reports than they are eager to issue optimistic reports. For a different look at the 
optimism differences, we also calculate the average/median local and foreign consensus with the 
sample of stocks covered by both local and foreign analysts. In results not reported, we find that 
                                                 
10 The standard error used in the calculation of the t-statistic for the difference in the proportion of local buys versus 
foreign buys is  
ffflll nsnhnb
PBFPBF
nsnhnb
PBLPBL
++
−+++
− )1()1(
 
where nbl, nhl, nsl, nbf, nhf, nsf  are the number of local buys, local holds, local sells, foreign buys, foreign holds, and 
foreign sells, and PBL and PBF are the proportion of local buys and foreign buys. The standard errors used for the 
differences in proportion of local versus foreign holds and sells are calculated analogously. 
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the average local consensus of 2.34 is statistically greater than the average foreign consensus of 
2.23 (t-statistic = 9.58). Similarly, the median local consensus of 2.35 is statistically greater than 
the median foreign consensus of 2.27 (t-statistic = 14.59).  
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 One concern is that if local analysts cover stocks with brighter future prospects than do 
foreign analysts, this may explain the apparent optimism among the former. To sidestep 
coverage issues, we employ the matching algorithm of Lin and McNichols (1998). For each local 
analyst recommendation, we find foreign analyst recommendations on the same stock within 60 
days of the recommendation. If there is more than one foreign recommendation, we match the 
foreign analyst recommendation that is issued closest to the date of the local analyst 
recommendation with the local analyst recommendation. If no foreign analyst recommendations 
are issued within 60 days of the local analyst recommendation, the local analyst recommendation 
is removed from the sample. Thus, we control for the characteristics of firms that local and 
foreign analysts choose to cover. This algorithm yields a matched sample of 21,132 local and 
21,132 foreign analyst recommendations. We then report the differences for this matched sample 
of stock recommendations. The results in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that differences in coverage 
cannot explain the greater recommendation optimism of local analysts.  
 Yet another concern is that other analyst and brokerage attributes may conspire to 
increase (reduce) the recommendation optimism of local (foreign) analysts. For example, foreign 
analysts may belong to larger and more established brokerages. These analysts may then eschew 
optimism for greater accuracy so as not to tarnish their stellar reputations. To address this 
concern, we estimate pooled cross-sectional regressions on recommendation optimism 
(recommendation minus consensus recommendation) with the local analyst dummy as an 
independent variable. If local analysts are reliably more optimistic than their foreign 
counterparts, the coefficient estimate on the local analyst dummy should be statistically positive. 
To account for the effects that analyst, firm, and brokerage attributes may have on 
recommendation optimism, we include the log of firm size, number of analysts covering the 
firm, analyst experience, number of firms covered by the analyst, and brokerage size (which we 
proxy with the number of analysts issuing recommendations for the brokerage) as controls in the 
regressions. The firm characteristics proxy for investment banking and trade generation 
concerns, while the analyst characteristics proxy for analyst reputation and career concerns. As 
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mentioned, brokerage size may capture analyst reputation effects.  Firm size may also proxy for 
the level of institutional holdings which Ljungqvist et al. (2006) show has a moderating effect on 
recommendation optimism because institutions reward accurate analysts with higher 
performance ratings. We include yearly and country dummies to capture variation in optimism 
over the sample period and across countries.  
 Concretely then, the regressions we estimate include 
(1) ,,,,,, tki
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ctry
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ctry
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yr
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yr
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where tkiOPT ,,  is the recommendation optimism (recommendation minus consensus 
recommendation) for analyst i and firm k in day t, LOCAL is the local analyst dummy, SIZE is 
firm size, NANALYST is the number of analysts covering the firm, EXP is the analyst experience 
in years, NFIRM is the number of firms covered by the analyst, BROKERSIZE is the brokerage 
size proxied by the number of analysts issuing recommendations for the brokerage, yrYRDUM is 
the dummy for year yr11, and ctryCTRYDUM  is the dummy for country ctry. For completeness, 
we also present results for the corresponding set of regressions without the yearly and country 
dummies, and for the matched sample as well. 
[please insert Table 3 here] 
 The results reported in Panel A of Table 3 provide strong evidence that local analysts are 
more optimistic than foreign analysts. The OLS coefficient estimates on the local analyst dummy 
are positive and statistically significant12 for all regression models. This is true whether or not we 
                                                 
11 We also perform regressions without yearly dummies but with observations clustered by year and obtain 
qualitatively similar results. We thank Mark Seasholes for this suggestion. 
12 Statistical significance is measured using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. As 
additional robustness tests, we also re-estimate the regressions using FGLS and MLE with firm-wise 
heteroskedasticity, as well as calculate the standard errors using the bootstrap. The results are very similar with these 
alternative specifications. 
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include the yearly and country dummies. Because the standard deviation of the OPT  variable is 
0.88, the coefficient estimate for the most comprehensive Eq 4 regression indicates that local 
analysts are 0.12 standard deviations more optimistic than foreign analysts. The only other 
independent variables that also display statistical significance across all model specifications and 
for both the full and matched sample are firm size, number of firms covered by analyst, yearly 
dummies, and country dummies. The reliably negative effect that firm size exerts on 
recommendation optimism is consistent with the view expounded by Ljungqvist et al. (2006) that 
the level of institutional holdings has a moderating effect on recommendation optimism. The 
negative coefficients on the number of firms covered by analyst variable may reflect a familiarity 
bias (Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2006)) among analysts. The pattern of coefficient estimates on the 
yearly dummies accords with simple intuition. The coefficient estimates for the 1997 and 2000 
dummies are large and statistically negative, reflecting the prevailing negative sentiment at the 
height of the Asian financial crisis13 and at the end of the technology bubble, respectively. 
Conversely, the coefficient estimates for the 1998 and 1999 dummies are large and statistically 
positive reflecting the positive sentiment during the technology bubble.  
 To sidestep coverage issues, we repeat the regression analysis on the sample of matched 
recommendations. The regression estimates on the local analyst dummy in Panel B of Table 3 
indicate that coverage differences do not drive our results.14 To get a sense of the robustness of 
the results across countries and time periods, we re-estimate the regressions for the last two 
model specifications (Eq. 3 and 4) by country and by sub-period for the following periods: 1994-
1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003. The results in Table 4 reveal that local analysts are more 
optimistic than foreign analysts for most countries and for all sub-periods. Moreover, the 
difference in recommendation optimism is statistically greater than zero for six of the eight 
countries (under Eq. 4) and for all sub-periods. Consistent with the investment banking story, 
one of the two countries without more optimistic local analysts, i.e., Indonesia, is also the 
country where local underwriters dominate the least (see Table A1). Interestingly, while the 
                                                 
13 To check that the Asian financial crisis does not unduly affect the results, we re-estimate the regressions in Table 
3 without the 1997 observations. The results are robust to dropping the 1997 observations from the sample. 
14 In the matched sample, the coefficient estimate on the NANALYST variable changes its sign and significance 
depending on the inclusion of the year and country dummies. We find that this is mostly because in 1997, during the 
Asian financial crisis, the number of analysts covering each firm is very low and the average level of optimism is 
also low. To check this, we re-estimate the Eq. 4 regression with full country dummies and a dummy for a particular 
year in the sample period. We do so ten times, i.e., once for each year in the sample period. We find that NANALYST 
changes sign from positive to negative only when we include the dummy for 1997.   
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introduction of measures by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission in 2000 to regulate the 
analyst industry and the resulting increased media scrutiny on analysts have diminished the 
overall optimism level in the U.S. (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006)), they have 
not diminished the optimism of local analysts relative to that of foreign analysts in emerging 
markets. The difference in optimism has remained fairly stable over the entire sample period.    
[please insert Table 4 and Table 5 here] 
 There may be concerns that the optimism differences we uncover are confined to certain 
stocks. If, for example, the optimism differences are restricted to small and non-index stocks, our 
study may not be relevant to institutional investors who typically trade large index stocks. To 
address these concerns, we split the sample of firm observations into equal number groups by 
firm size and firm book-to-market ratio, and we re-estimate the Eq. 3 and 4 regressions for each 
subsample separately. We do the same for stocks that belong to the MSCI global world free 
index and those that do not belong to that index. The coefficients on the local analyst dummy and 
their t-statistics, reported in Panel A of Table 5, make clear that the optimism differences are 
pervasive and robust across index, non-index, small, large, value, and growth stocks.  
 In addition, we examine the optimism differences for recommendations stratified by 
brokerage type. Specifically, we test whether the effects are confined to large brokerages which 
employ many analysts or to small brokerages which employ few analysts. We also check 
whether the optimism differences are more acute with foreign analysts whose brokerages have a 
local presence or with foreign analysts whose brokerages do not have a local presence, and 
whether the optimism differences apply to U.S.-based or to non-U.S.-based foreign brokerages. 
The results in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that the optimism differences persist across brokerage 
types. In particular, the optimism differences are statistically significant with analysts from large 
brokerages who presumably have higher ability and with analysts from small brokerages who 
presumably have lower ability. The coefficient estimates in columns three and four of Panel B 
also indicate that the optimism difference between local analysts and foreign analysts with local 
presence is smaller than that between local analysts and foreign analysts without local presence. 
This in turn suggests that among foreign analysts, those with local presence are more optimistic 
than those without local presence.  One reason may be that foreign brokerages with a local 
presence get a disproportionate amount of the underwriting business allocated to foreign 
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brokerages. We also find that U.S. analysts are more optimistic than non-U.S. foreign analysts, 
though U.S. analysts are still less optimistic relative to local analysts.  
  
B. Recommendation Performance 
 
 In this section we test the implications of the relative optimism uncovered in the previous 
section on the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns following local and foreign analyst 
recommendations. We analyze the returns accruing to the stocks that have buy, hold, or sell 
recommendations as well as stocks that have been upgraded to a buy or downgraded to a sell. 
Our analysis focuses on the announcement day as well as one week, one month, and two months 
following the announcement to gauge the information content of the recommendation. 
 If the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns is consistent with the optimism results in 
the previous section, then local analyst buys should underperform foreign analyst buys while 
local analyst sells should outperform foreign analyst sells. The underlying intuition is that local 
analysts are more eager to issue buy calls on local stocks. As a result, foreign buy calls contain 
more positive information. Conversely, local analysts are more reluctant to issue sell calls on 
local stocks. As a result, local sell calls contain more negative information.  If, however, the 
pattern of cumulative abnormal returns is consistent with local analysts having an informational 
advantage over foreign analysts through geographical proximity (Hau (2001), Malloy (2005), 
and Choe, Kho, and Stulz, (2005)) then the local buys/sells should outperform foreign buys/sells. 
Conversely, if foreign analysts, who may have greater expertise and access to better resources, 
possess informational advantages over local analysts (Seasholes (2006) and Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2000)), then local buys/sells should underperform foreign buys/sells. An analysis of 
the pattern in cumulative abnormal returns thus allows us to discriminate between the relative 
optimism and the informational advantage stories.  
[please insert Table 6 here] 
 The pattern of cumulative abnormal returns, reported in Table 6, is broadly consistent 
with local analysts being more optimistic than foreign analysts. Buys and holds issued by local 
analysts underperform buys and holds issued by foreign analysts for all horizons. Conversely, 
sells issued by local analysts outperform sells issued by foreign analysts for all horizons tested. 
Similar results are obtained with upgrades to buy and downgrades to sell. Moreover, the 
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differences in cumulative abnormal return following local and foreign analyst recommendations 
are almost always statistically significant.   For example, during the announcement day, local 
buys underperform foreign buys by 24 basis points, while local sells outperform foreign sells by 
-22 basis points. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
announcement day return spread between a foreign analyst buy and a local analyst sell is an 
economically significant 1.09%, outperforming the spread between foreign buys and sells, and 
the spread between local buys and sells. In fact, the same result holds over all horizons and with 
upgrades/downgrades as well. To sidestep coverage issues, we also redo the CAR analysis on the 
sample of matched firms and obtain similar results.  
 It is intriguing to note that contrary to studies on analyst recommendations in the U.S. 
which show that buy recommendations on U.S. stocks have less informational content than sell 
recommendations (see Womack (1996) and Barber, et al. (2001)), the absolute cumulative 
average returns following a foreign analyst buy or upgrade are greater than those following a 
foreign analyst sell or downgrade for emerging market stocks (see the point estimates in columns 
five to eight of Table 6). This sharply contrasts with the informational content of U.S. stock 
recommendations. One reason for the dissonance may be that the investment banking induced 
incentive to bias recommendations on U.S. stocks does not apply as strongly to emerging market 
stocks, at least for foreign analysts. 
 Given that cross-sectional dependence issues may bias the test statistics for the abnormal 
performance measures calculated above (see Mitchell and Stafford (2000)), we also examine the 
performance of calendar-based portfolios. The calendar time portfolio approach has its own 
drawbacks which motivate using both approaches. According to Loughran and Ritter (2000), the 
calendar time portfolio approach has lower power to detect abnormal performance when it exists 
mostly in periods of high event activity.  Our calendar time portfolio approach follows that of 
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2006). We form five portfolios for each group of analysts (local 
and foreign): a buy portfolio, a hold portfolio, a sell portfolio, an upgrade to buy portfolio, and a 
downgrade to sell portfolio.  
 To understand how these portfolios are constructed, take the buy portfolio as an example. 
For each local analyst in the database, we identify initiations and reiterations of buy 
recommendations. For each of these recommendations, the recommended stock enters the buy 
portfolio at the close of the trading day of the announcement. Each recommended stock remains 
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in the portfolio until the stock is downgraded or dropped from coverage by the analyst (we 
assume this occurs when recommendations have not been updated after 240 days). If more than 
one analyst recommends a particular stock on a given date, then that stock appears multiple times 
in the portfolio on that date, one for each buy recommendation. Please see Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman (2006) for more details on the construction of the calendar time portfolios.        
 Next, we estimate performance relative to the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
(5)  ,itiiiit eRMRFr ++= βα  
(6)  ,itiiiiiiiit eHMLhSMBsRMRFr ++++= βα  and 
(7)  ,1 itiiiiiiiiiit eYRPRpHMLhSMBsRMRFr +++++= βα  
where Tt ,...,1= , itr  is the daily return on calendar time portfolio i in excess of the risk free rate, 
RMRF is the excess return on a value-weighted aggregate market proxy, and SMB, HML, and 
PR1YR are returns on a value-weighted, zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, 
book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns. The four-factor model adds to 
the three-factor model a momentum factor, PR1YR, which captures the Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) one-year momentum anomaly. The Fama and French (1993) factors are calculated in the 
same way as in Fama and French (1998). For example, to form the SMB factor, we rank all 
sample firms in each country in descending order by their market capitalization at the end of 
each year. Then, we form a large-cap portfolio with the top 30% of stocks and a small-cap 
portfolio with the bottom 30% of stocks. Then, we calculate the value-weighted daily returns of 
each portfolio. The country SMB portfolio is the difference between the return on the small-cap 
portfolio and the return on the large-cap portfolio. The SMB factor we use is a value-weighted 
country SMB factor in which the weights are based on the stock market capitalizations of the 
eight countries in the sample.   
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 The abnormal returns of the calendar time portfolios reported in Table 7 broadly 
corroborate the results from the cumulative abnomal return analysis. However, while local 
analyst buys/holds still underperform foreign analyst buys/holds, the difference in performance is 
no longer statistically significant at the 10% level. Nonetheless, local analyst sells continue to 
reliably outperform foreign analyst sells by -3.4 basis points per day or -8.16% per year (t-
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statistic = 1.96) after adjusting for return covariation with the Fama and French (1993) factors. 
Sharper results emerge from the analysis of analyst recommendation changes. After adjusting for 
return covariation with the Fama and French factors, local analyst upgrades underperform 
foreign analyst upgrades by 3 basis points per day or 7.2% annualized, while local analyst 
downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades by -5.9 basis points per day or -14.2% 
annualized. Both spreads are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 The weaker results for buy recommendations are consistent with the distribution of 
recommendation levels reported in Table 2, where the difference in proportion is more striking 
for sells than for buys. The stronger results for the recommendation changes with the calendar 
time approach are also consistent with the results from other U.S. studies which show that 
recommendation changes contain more information than recommendation levels. It is also 
comforting to note from Panel F of Table 7 that the strategy that buys foreign upgrades and short 
sells local downgrades outperforms strategies based solely on local recommendation changes or 
solely on foreign recommendation changes. These results neatly complement the 
upgrade/downgrade spread results in Panel B of Table 6. Overall, the calendar time portfolio 
analysis provides additional evidence on the underperformance of local analyst upgrades and the 
overperformance of local analyst sells/downgrades. It also echoes the results of Barber, Lehavy, 
and Trueman (2006), who analyze the recommendation performance of two groups of analysts 
facing different investment banking pressure: analysts from U.S. investment banks and analysts 
working at independent U.S. research firms.  
  
C. Trade Reaction to Analyst Recommendations 
 
 According to the Wall Street Journal (July 14, 1992), Morgan Stanley asserts that 
customers of its equity research reports are too sophisticated to accept research influenced by 
investment banking pressure. In this section, we test whether sophisticated foreign investors, 
local institutions, and local retail investors recognize the full extent of the bias among local 
analysts. As Michaely and Womack (2005) put it, “if investors are aware of this marketing bias 
and discount it appropriately, then, to some extent, no harm is done.” 
 To see whether “no harm is done,” we analyze the trade reactions of investors grouped by 
investor type in the Korea Stock Exchange to local and foreign analyst recommendations and 
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upgrades/downgrades. The Korea Stock Exchange provides access to daily net buys grouped by 
investor types for all stocks traded on the Exchange. Our analysis focuses on the standardized 
trade imbalance (our proxy for buying pressure) by investor type on day 0 to 1 of the 
recommendation where day 0 is the day of the recommendation announcement. The standardized 
trade imbalance15 for firm i, investor type x, and date t is 
(8)  
)( )(,,
)(,,,,
,,
tyearxi
tyearxitxistd
txi TIstddev
TITI
TI
−=    where 
(9)  
txitxi
txitxi
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,, __
__
+
−= .  
The variables )(,, tyearxiTI  and )( )(,, tyearxiTIstddev  are the mean and standard deviation of TI or 
trade imbalance for firm i, investor type x, over year t, respectively. 
 Our use of the standardized trade imbalance follows Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2006) and adjusts for firm and year fixed effects as well as systematic volatility differences in 
large and small stocks. This facilitates comparison of trade imbalance across time, firms, and 
investor types. To gauge the trade reaction to recommendations, we estimate two sets of 
regressions for each investor type. First, we regress standardized trade imbalance on buy, hold, 
and sell dummies. Second, we regress the standardized trade imbalance on upgrade and 
downgrade dummies.  
[please insert Table 8 here] 
 The results from the analysis of the standardized trade imbalance, reported in Table 8, are 
striking. First, in response to buy recommendations and upgrades, sophisticated foreign investors 
and local institutions buy while local retail investors sell. Conversely, in response to analyst sell 
recommendations and downgrades, foreign investors and local institutions sell while local retail 
investors buy. These effects are statistically different from zero for the average recommendation 
for retail investors and local institutions, and may help explain the overperformance of 
institutions and underperformance of retail investors in emerging markets (see, for instance, 
Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2006)).  
                                                 
15 The standardized trade imbalances are based on the number of shares bought and sold. We also redo the analysis 
using standardized trade imbalance based on the value of shares bought and sold. Our results are almost identical 
with this alternate calculation of standardized trade imbalance. The results are also virtually identical when we use 
abnormal trade imbalance or )(,,,, tyearxitxi TITI −  instead of standardized trade imbalance. 
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 Second, local institutions react more to local analyst reports while foreign investors react 
more to foreign analyst reports. The standardized trade imbalances of local institutions in 
response to local analyst buys, holds, sells, and downgrades are larger in magnitude than their 
standardized trade imbalances in response to foreign analyst buys, holds, sells, and downgrades, 
respectively. On the other hand, the standardized trade imbalances of foreign investors in 
response to local analyst recommendations are smaller in magnitude than their trade imbalances 
in response to foreign analyst recommendations. This is not surprising given that local analyst 
recommendations are more accessible to local institutions while foreign analyst 
recommendations are more accessible to foreign institutions.  
 Third, despite the optimistic nature of local analyst recommendations, local institutions 
buy more after a local buy recommendation than they sell after a local sell recommendation. 
While they do react in the correct fashion to local holds, their marked response to local buys 
(standardized trade imbalance = 0.065) relative to local sells (standardized trade imbalance = -
0.044) indicates that they do not fully internalize the bias in local analyst recommendations.  
 Fourth, foreign investors appear to trade on the belief that foreign analyst 
recommendations are positively biased. Despite the fact that foreign analyst buys and upgrades 
possess greater informational content (insofar as reflected in the CAR results of Tables 616) than 
do foreign analyst sells and downgrades, respectively, foreign investors react more to foreign 
sells and downgrades than to foreign buys and upgrades. Following a foreign analyst sell call, 
foreign investors react with a standardized trade imbalance of -0.127 which is more than twice as 
large in absolute terms as that following foreign analyst buy calls (standardized trade imbalance 
= 0.057). One view is that the belief, formed over U.S. stock recommendations, that sells are 
more informative than buys (Womack (1996)) is so ingrained among foreign investors that it 
influences their trades in emerging market stocks as well. 
 Fifth, neither the sophisticated foreign investors nor the local institutions appear fully 
aware of the optimism differences between foreign and local analysts. Despite the evidence 
showing that local sells convey more negative information than foreign sells, foreign investors 
                                                 
16 We believe that the CAR results are more relevant for the trade reaction analysis over day 0 to 1. This is because 
the CAR analysis better captures the short term returns to following analyst announcements than does the calendar 
time portfolio analysis. The CAR results in Table 6 are based on the full sample of countries. We also estimate the 
CARs for the sample of stocks in the Korean Stock Exchange. While the statistical significance of the results falls 
naturally with the reduced sample size, the pattern of CARs for the stocks in the Korean Stock Exchange is very 
similar to that for the full sample of countries. 
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buy following local sells. While local institutions trade in the right direction in response to sells 
and buys from both local and foreign analysts, the ratio of their standardized trade imbalance 
following buys to their standardized trade imbalance following sells for local analysts (= -1.48) 
is higher in absolute terms relative to the corresponding ratio for foreign analysts (= -0.77). This 
indicates that local institutions trade as if the information in local analyst buys relative to sells is 
higher than that in foreign analyst buys relative to sells.17 
[please insert Figure 1 here] 
 The trade reaction graphs in Figure 1 map out the standardized trade imbalance by 
investor type, two days before to five days after recommendation announcements from local and 
foreign analysts. They depict a rich and intuitive pattern in investor behavior. In addition to 
corroborating the results from Table 8, the trade reaction graphs suggest that foreign investors 
may get a sneak peak at the analyst reports (local and foreign) before they are announced.18 
Neither local institutions nor local retail investors demonstrate a similar uncanny ability to 
predict analyst announcements. This finding echoes the results of Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett 
(2006) show that U.S. institutions receive and act on tips on analyst recommendations up to five 
days in advance of the announcement date. In addition, the pattern in standardized trade 
imbalance of retail investors suggests that they tend to react with a lag of two or three days to 
local analyst recommendation announcements. This is consistent with the view that while 
institutions (local and foreign) get timely access to analyst reports in exchange for brokerage 
business, retail investors must contend with less preferential access to analyst research. 
 Our trade reaction results also relate to those of Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2006) 
who analyze the reaction of small and large trades around analyst recommendations. Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar (2006) find that large traders are better able to recognize the bias in analyst 
recommendations than small traders. Their results are consistent with our trade reaction results to 
the extent that the local institutions (i.e., the large traders) exert selling pressure following holds 
                                                 
17 One caveat is that in response to upgrades and downgrades, domestic institutions correctly trade as if local 
upgrades contain less information than local downgrades, and as if foreign upgrades contain more information than 
foreign downgrades. 
18 The standardized trade imbalances of foreign investors are statistically different from zero two days prior to the 
announcements but statistically positive one day prior to the announcements. Specifically, the t-statistic that tests 
whether the standardized trade imbalance for foreign investors one day prior to an announcement is equal to zero is 
2.46 for all analyst buys, 1.76 for local analyst buys, and 1.73 for foreign analyst buys. This is also consistent, 
however, with foreign investors trading on the same information as that in analyst buy reports on the day before the 
announcement. 
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by local analysts while the local retail investors (i.e., the small traders) exert pressure that is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero following holds by local analysts.  The local institutions 
appear to be aware of the tendency of local analysts to issue holds when sells are warranted, 
whereas the local retail investors appear to be unaware of this bias. 
 In summary, the results in this section indicate that while sophisticated foreign investors 
and local institutions in emerging markets actively follow analyst recommendations, they do not 
fully internalize the relative optimism of local analysts. They trade, incorrectly, as if foreign 
analysts are more optimistic than local analysts. It seems that these investors overestimate the 
pressures facing foreign analysts and underestimate the pressures facing local analysts.19 Hence, 
the ability of sophisticated investors to unravel and correctly assess the investment banking 
pressures of sell-side analysts, purported by Morgan Stanley, appears suspect. 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
 Many factors may drive the higher levels of optimism among local analysts. Local 
analysts may face greater pressures to generate brokerage commissions than do foreign analysts. 
Reputable foreign analysts may seek to protect their stellar reputations by not making biased 
calls. Foreign analysts may cover firms with greater institutional presence. Because analysts 
depend on institutions for performance ratings and brokerage commissions, pressures by 
institutional investors may induce foreign analysts to generate more objective reports (Ljungqvist 
et al. (2006)). Foreign analysts may shade their recommendations in light of the currency and 
country risks inherent in emerging country stocks. Local analysts may suffer from familiarity 
bias. Alternatively, local analysts may be biased because they have prior underwriting 
relationships with local firms. The selection hypothesis (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)) 
suggests that this bias may stem from IPO firms choosing underwriters with analysts who are 
predisposed to the firm. Alternatively, the cognitive bias hypothesis (Kahneman and Lovallo 
(1993)) contends that affiliated analysts are biased because they truly believe that the firms they 
underwrite are superior to the firms underwritten by their competitors. Finally, local analysts 
                                                 
19 To reconcile these results with those of Table 6, there must be informed traders at the margin who correctly 
estimate the pressures facing local and foreign analysts.  
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may face greater investment banking pressure20 than do foreign analysts. This section carefully 
explores the possibility that these factors motivate the difference in recommendation optimism 
between local and foreign analysts.  
 
A. Brokerage Commissions 
 
 If local analysts truly face greater pressures to generate brokerage commissions than do 
foreign analysts, it may explain why local analysts issue more buy recommendations. However, 
the difference in the number of buy recommendations issued is small (see Table 2). Moreover, if 
the pressure to generate commissions motivates the bias difference between local and foreign 
analysts, then the bias difference should be exacerbated when we limit ourselves to large stocks. 
By definition, institutions hold more, in dollar terms, large stocks than small stocks. Pressures to 
generate commissions should be less acute with small stocks.21 However, we find that the 
coefficient on the local analyst dummy for small stocks (see column four in Panel A of Table 5) 
is still comparable to that for the full sample and is highly statistically significant. Hence, it is 
unlikely that the pressure to generate brokerage commissions lie at the root of our results. 
 
B. Analyst Reputation Concerns 
 
 If foreign analysts are more reputable than local analysts, then foreign analysts may be 
more inclined to issue objective recommendations to protect their reputations. Table 1 indicates 
that foreign analysts belong to larger brokerages employing more analysts. Relative to local 
analysts, these foreign analysts are likely to be better paid and have better reputations. However, 
if the reputation concerns story holds, then reputable analysts should be more objective than 
other analysts. To test this directly, we augment the Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 regressions of Table 3 with a 
dummy that equals one if an analyst belongs to an Institutional Investor magazine All-Asia 
                                                 
20 Clearly, investment banking pressure can exist net of underwriter affiliation effects. Intuitively, the need to 
generate future investment banking business, and not just the need to reward past investment banking business, 
should motivate optimism among sell-side analysts. 
21 This argument implicitly assumes that analysts cater more to institutions than to retail investors. Our trade 
reaction results in Table 8 indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. Unlike institutional investors, retail investors 
seem to react with a significant lag to analyst recommendation announcements. 
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team22 in the previous election year, and equals zero otherwise. We find that analysts from All-
Asia teams are more optimistic than other analysts. These results are statistically significant at 
the 1% level (t-statistic = 2.63 in the augmented Eq. 4 regression), and run counter to the view 
that the higher reputation results in lower recommendation optimism among analysts. In fact, 
when we breakdown the All-Asia team dummy into a dummy for the first-place All-Asia team, a 
dummy for the second-place All-Asia team, etc, we find that analysts in the first-place All-Asia 
team are significantly more optimistic that other analysts (t-statistic = 5.49 in the augmented Eq. 
4 regression). Moreover, the coefficient estimates fall as we move from the first-place to the 
fourth-place team dummy (All-Asia analysts are placed into four teams) strongly suggesting that 
having a better reputation does not necessarily result in lower optimism among analysts.  
 
C. Institutional Presence 
 
 Greater institutional presence among stocks recommended by foreign analysts may also 
account for the lower levels of optimism among foreign analysts (Ljungqvist et al. (2006)). This 
view necessarily implies that the difference in bias falls when we constrain the sample to MSCI 
index stocks, which are widely held by institutions and where variation in institutional presence 
is less than across the full sample of firms. By re-estimating the Eq. 3 and 4 regressions on the 
sample of MSCI firms, we find that the difference in optimism levels between local and foreign 
analysts is actually larger relative to that for the full sample of firms. The coefficients on the 
local analyst dummy for the MSCI sample of firms are 0.120 (t-statistic = 13.86) and 0.117 (t-
statistic = 11.27) for the Eq. 3 and 4 regressions, respectively (see Table 5). Those for the full 
sample are 0.116 and 0.104, respectively (see Table 3). The strength of the local analyst dummy 
coefficients in the MSCI index stock sample indicates that institutional presence does not 
account for the difference in optimism levels between local and foreign analysts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 To select members for the All-Asia teams (which are analogous to the All-America teams), Institutional Investor 
sends a questionnaire to directors of research and heads of investment at approximately 400 institutions and 
investment firms that are major investors in the Asia ex-Japan region. The rankings are published in May every year. 
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D. Country and Currency Risk 
 
 Institutional presence aside, foreign analysts, who cater primarily to sophisticated foreign 
institutions, may shade their recommendations of emerging market stocks in light of the country 
and currency risks inherent in emerging markets. To test this hypothesis, we augment the Eq. 4 
regression in Table 3 with three independent variables: currency risk, country risk, and the 
interaction of country risk with the local analyst dummy. For a recommendation issued by an 
analyst headquartered in country x and on a stock in country y, we take as currency risk the 
standard deviation of daily returns of currency y relative to base currency x over the past year. By 
definition, the currency risk for local analyst recommendations is zero since x equals y in those 
cases. We use the Euromoney’s annual estimate of country risk as our country risk variable.23 
 Not surprisingly, we find that the coefficients on currency risk and country risk are both 
negative and statistically different from zero, reflecting the dampening effect that risk has on 
recommendation optimism levels. However, the interaction variable between the country risk 
and local analyst dummy variable is mildly negative (but statistically indistinguishable from 
zero) as well. It appears that country risk affects local analyst recommendations more than it 
affects foreign analyst recommendations. Consequently, the coefficient estimate on the local 
analyst dummy is virtually identical (coefficient estimate = 0.103) with the augmented Eq. 4 
regression and remains statistically different from zero at the 1% level (t-statistic = 8.20). One 
possible reason for this is that, local analysts, unlike foreign analysts, are affected by prevailing 
local sentiment, which is negatively correlated with country risk. 
 
E. Familiarity Bias 
 
 Moreover, the optimism of local analysts may be driven by familiarity bias, which has 
been linked to the traditional home bias literature (see, for example, Bailey, Kumar, and Ng 
(2006)). The familiarity bias story suggests that local analysts may develop a stronger preference 
for local stocks because they are more in tune with local companies than are foreign analysts. 
This view also implies that the local analyst optimism should fall once we control for the number 
                                                 
23 Euromoney gives a higher score (ranging from 0 to 100) to a less risky country. We transform the score and use 
(100-original Euromoney score)/10 so that the score is positively correlated with the level of risk. 
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of stocks covered. Further, any familiarity bias-induced optimism differences should be 
attenuated when we compare local analysts to foreign analysts who reside locally. However, in 
Table 3, we find that controlling for the number of firms an analyst covers barely affects the 
coefficient estimate on the local analyst dummy. Also, in Panel B of Table 5, we find that foreign 
analysts whose brokerages have a local presence (and hence are more likely to reside locally) are 
only somewhat less pessimistic (relative to local analysts) than foreign analysts whose 
brokerages do not have a local presence.  
 
F. Selection and Cognitive Biases 
 
 Another explanation for the greater optimism of local analysts could be that there are 
more local than foreign affiliated analysts and that affiliated analysts suffer from selection or 
cognitive biases. That is, either firms select underwriters based in part on how favorable the 
underwriter’s analysts are about the firm (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)), or analysts believe 
that any firm underwritten by their brokerage must be superior to firms underwritten by 
competing brokerages (Kaheman and Lovallo (1993)). If this holds true, then the optimism 
differences between local and foreign analysts should disappear once we control for analyst 
affiliation status. To this end, we re-estimate the Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 regressions augmented with a 
dummy for past underwriter affiliation and a dummy for future underwriter affiliation. Our 
analysis includes only firms for which we have underwriter information from 1990 to 2004. As a 
result, the number of firm-recommendation observations falls by about 47% relative to that in 
Table 3. We consider several variants of the affiliation dummies including one-year, two-year, 
five-year, and infinite-year affiliation dummies. The one-year past affiliation dummy takes a 
value of one if the analyst belongs to the lead or co-lead underwriter for the firm’s IPO or SEO 
not more than a year ago. It takes a value of zero otherwise. The other past affiliation dummies 
and the future affiliation dummies are defined analogously.  
[please insert Table 9 here] 
 The pattern in past and future affiliation dummy coefficients reported in Table 9 is 
intriguing. Over all horizons, the coefficient for the past affiliation dummy is positive. With the 
infinite look-back period, the past affiliation dummy is statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level for both the Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 regressions. At the same time, the future affiliation dummy is 
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statistically positive over all of the look-ahead horizons. With the infinite look-ahead horizon, 
the coefficient estimate on the future affiliation dummy is about one and a half times that of the 
corresponding past affiliation dummy. Nonetheless, despite the explanatory power of the 
affiliation dummies and the 47% reduction in sample size, the local analyst dummy coefficient is 
still statistically positive at the 1% level for all regression specifications.  A comparison of the 
coefficients on the local analyst dummy for the most comprehensive regression specification 
(Eq. 4) in Table 3 and in Table 9 reveals that the infinite horizon past and future affiliation 
effects only account for less than 5% of the optimism differences between local and foreign 
analysts. Clearly, one cannot explain the bulk of the optimism differences with underwriting-
induced selection and cognitive bias.  
 
G. Investment Banking Pressures 
 
 The evidence presented thus far suggests that the difference in recommendation optimism 
between local and foreign analysts is not mainly driven by brokerage commissions, reputation 
concerns, institutional presence, country and currency risk, familiarity bias, and underwriting 
induced selection and cognitive bias. It remains to test the link between investment banking 
pressures (sans underwriter affiliation effects) and local analyst recommendation optimism.  
 In this effort, we estimate Eq. 4 regressions augmented with two investment banking 
proxies: the number of equity issues within the firm’s country and the proportion of equity issues 
underwritten by brokerages in the analyst’s brokerage country.24 We hypothesize that when issue 
volume is higher and hence market-wide investment banking pressures are stronger, local 
analysts are even more optimistic, relative to their foreign counterparts, than when issue volume 
is low. Hence, the first proxy enters as an interaction variable in the regression. The second 
proxy enters directly into the regression as it captures investment banking pressures specific to 
the analyst’s brokerage country. We also include past and future affiliation dummies (with an 
infinite look back/ahead period) among the regressors to abstract from any affiliation effects. We 
                                                 
24 The proportion of equity issues is based on the ratio of the number of equity issues underwritten by brokerages in 
the analyst’s country to the total number of equity issues. In results available upon request, we perform the 
analogous augmented Eq. 3 regressions, and use investment banking proxies based on the value of equity issues.  
We obtain qualitatively similar results with these alternative specifications. 
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consider investment banking proxies lagged one year, in the current year, and one year ahead to 
accommodate any lead/lag effects. 
[please insert Table 10 here] 
 The coefficient estimates reported in Table 10 reveal a strong link between the 
investment banking proxies and differences between local and foreign analyst recommendation 
optimism. Relative to the baseline regression results in the far right column of Table 9, the 
results in the far right column of Table 10 indicate that variation in the investment banking 
proxies explains up to 87% of the coefficient estimate on the local analyst dummy. Indeed, 
relative recommendation optimism among local analysts appears to be correlated with the 
number and proportion (by brokerage country) of issues underwritten in the next year. The 
coefficient estimates in the fifth column of Table 10 suggest that the number and proportion of 
issues in the next year alone can explain 70% of the optimism differences between local and 
foreign analysts. Insofar as optimistic analyst reports parlay into future business for underwriters, 
this suggests that analysts correctly anticipate changes in the issue volume and proportion, and 
adjust their recommendation optimism accordingly.25 More importantly, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on the investment banking proxies one year ahead suggest 
that local analysts increase their recommendation optimism more than foreign analysts in 
response to anticipated increases in the issue volume, and that analysts based in countries which 
capture a higher proportion of underwriting in the market are more optimistic than others. In fact, 
the results in Table 10 indicate that the local analyst dummy in Table 3 only matters to the extent 
that it captures the higher levels of investment banking business directed to local brokerages (see 
Table A1). This provides clear and direct evidence relating investment banking pressures to the 
delta in optimism between local and foreign analysts. 
   
V. Conclusion 
 
 This study documents a unique and novel form of home bias. We show that local analyst 
recommendations in emerging market stocks are more optimistic than foreign analyst 
                                                 
25 Of course the causality could run the other way. That is, optimistic analyst reports parlay into greater investment 
banking deal flow in the future. However the fact that we already include future underwriter affiliation as one of the 
controls in the Table 10 regressions suggests that this is unlikely to be the case.  
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recommendations. This pattern of optimism is pervasive across countries, time periods, small 
stocks, large stocks, value stocks, growth stocks, index stocks, and non-index stocks, and persists 
even after controlling for analyst affiliation.  
 It also has important implications for returns. On one hand, upgrades and buy 
recommendations by foreign analysts convey more positive information than upgrades and buy 
recommendations by local analysts. On the other hand, downgrades and sell recommendations by 
local analysts convey more negative information than downgrades and sell recommendations by 
foreign analysts. Yet, neither sophisticated foreign investors nor local institutions fully account 
for the differences in optimism between local and foreign analysts. In particular, foreign 
investors trade, incorrectly, as if foreign analyst sells are more informative than their buys while 
local institutions trade, incorrectly, as if local analyst buys are more informative than their sells.   
 The fact that emerging market stocks are typically underwritten by local brokerages 
suggests that differences in investment banking pressure between local and foreign underwriters 
may be at the root of the differences in recommendation optimism. We consider various 
competing explanations including brokerage commission pressures, analyst reputation concerns, 
institutional presence, currency and country risk, familiarity bias, and underwriting-induced 
selection and cognitive biases, but find no evidence to suggest that these explanations account 
for the bulk of the optimism differences. In contrast, country-specific investment banking proxies 
completely account for those optimism differences. 
 The results suggest several avenues for future work. In studies on the classic home bias, a 
better understanding of how local investors react to optimistic local analyst recommendations 
may shed light on why local investors gravitate toward local stocks. In studies on international 
investors, incorporating differences in recommendation optimism between local and foreign 
analysts may help account for differences in trading profits and apparent informational 
asymmetries between local and foreign investors. 
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Figure 1 shows the standardized trade imbalance of various investor types in relation to local and foreign analyst recommendations. The sample period is from 1995
to 2003. Analysts are classified as local or foreign according to the location of the head office of their brokerage relative to the stock covered. Standardized trade
imbalance is the ratio of buys minus sells divided by total buys and sells after adjusting for firm and year fixed effects and the volatility differences across firms.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of the recommendation announcement.
Figure 1
Trade Reaction to Local and Foreign Analyst Recommendations Grouped by Investor Type
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Country/ time 
periods
Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign
India 22 31 330 407 783 704 4 5 7 167 1.7 2.1 2932 9719
Indonesia 8 37 164 195 552 494 5 4 5 151 2.1 2.3 1863 8434
Korea 30 31 1038 567 394 793 9 4 15 183 1.8 2.0 17935 10211
Malaysia 16 52 334 364 809 754 7 5 9 116 2.4 2.6 7658 18764
Philippines 5 37 98 125 937 514 8 4 3 154 1.9 2.1 800 8398
Singapore 13 44 354 321 889 1056 5 4 24 136 2.8 2.2 7553 13962
Taiwan 9 33 380 439 1623 1353 7 4 15 172 1.6 1.9 2535 10957
Thailand 6 45 211 439 469 413 7 5 6 134 1.7 2.3 1906 15877
1994-1997 41 53 1550 2181 1035 717 6 6 21 113 1.8 1.9 9552 40619
1998-2000 51 52 1841 1483 696 763 8 5 16 130 2.1 2.3 13453 28339
2001-2003 84 33 1880 1331 668 815 6 4 14 157 2.1 2.5 20177 27364
1994-2003 109 74 2909 2858 807 760 7 5 17 131 2.0 2.2 43182 96322
Panel A: Sample statistics by country
Panel B: Sample statistics by subperiod
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Panel A of the table reports the summary statistics for local and foreign brokerages in the eight countries we study from January 1994 through December 2003. Panel B
reports the same set of statistics for subperiods. 'Number of brokerages' refers to the total number of brokerages making recommendations during the period. 'Number
of firms covered' refers to the total number of firms covered by each analyst group. Time-series and cross-sectional averages of year-end market capitalization (in USD
millions) of firms covered by analysts are also reported. 'Number of firms covered per analyst' refers to the average number of firms covered by each analyst. 'Number
of analysts per brokerage' refers to the average number of worldwide analysts working for the brokerage. 'Analyst experience' denotes the average number of years an
analyst has been covering the country since 1994. 'Number of analyst recommendations' refers to the total number of recommendations made by the analyst group.
Number of 
brokerages
Number of firms 
covered
Average firm size 
(millions/USD)
Number of firms 
covered per analyst
Number of analysts 
per brokerage
Analyst experience 
(years)
Number of analyst 
recommendations
Recommendation Local Foreign Local Foreign Diff t -stat
Buy 20108 44080 46.56% 45.76% 0.80% 2.77
Hold 15426 28466 35.72% 29.55% 6.17% 22.57
Sell 7648 23776 17.71% 24.68% -6.97% -30.28
Buy 10532 9959 49.84% 47.13% 2.71% 5.58
Hold 6825 5881 32.30% 27.83% 4.47% 10.03
Sell 3775 5292 17.86% 25.04% -7.18% -18.04
Panel A: Full sample
Panel B: Matched sample
Table 2
Distribution of Analyst Recommendations
Summary statistics of analyst recommendations broken down by recommendation type. The first two columns report the
number of local and foreign analyst recommendations. The third column reports the proportion of all local
recommendations that are buys/holds/sells. The fourth column reports the same statistics for foreign recommendations. The
fifth column reports the difference in proportion for local versus foreign analysts while the sixth column reports the
associated t -statistic. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2003.
Number of observations Proportion
Independent variable
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4
Local analyst dummy 0.145** 0.113** 0.121** 0.109** 0.145** 0.116** 0.116** 0.104**
(27.76) (20.65) (21.21) (15.98) (24.92) (19.13) (18.78) (14.00)
Log of firm size -0.051** -0.052** -0.052** -0.048** -0.033** -0.033**
(-28.27) (-24.77) (-24.61) (-25.53) (-13.94) (-13.87)
Analyst experience 0.001 0.002 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.95) (1.07) (-3.20) (-3.14)
Number of firms covered by analyst -0.021** -0.022** -0.021** -0.022**
(-4.89) (-5.13) (-4.67) (-4.91)
Number of analysts covering firm -0.007 -0.004 -0.620** -0.619**
(-0.16) (-0.09) (-11.77) (-11.76)
Number of analysts in brokerage -0.006** -0.005**
(-3.39) (-2.87)
Local analyst dummy 0.109** 0.111** 0.118** 0.113** 0.109** 0.111** 0.116** 0.115**
(12.68) (12.59) (13.07) (9.31) (12.74) (12.65) (12.89) (9.47)
Log of firm size -0.049** -0.056** -0.056** -0.047** -0.031** -0.031**
(-15.13) (-14.69) (-14.68) (-13.94) (-7.32) (-7.32)
Analyst experience 0.000 0.000 -0.007* -0.007*
(0.01) (0.01) (-2.54) (-2.54)
Number of firms covered by analyst -0.027** -0.027** -0.024** -0.024**
(-3.79) (-3.83) (-3.25) (-3.24)
Number of analysts covering firm 0.202** 0.203** -0.609** -0.609**
(2.75) (2.76) (-6.65) (-6.65)
Number of analysts in brokerage -0.003 0.000
(-0.65) (-0.07)
Panel A: Full sample
Panel B: Matched sample
Table 3
Regressions on Analyst Recommendation Optimism
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation-firm observations in the sample at that time. The
dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month's median recommendation. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations
are excluded from the analysis. The recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. Analyst experience is measured in years.
All numbers for analysts and firms are in hundreds. The coefficients on the intercept and the country and yearly dummies are suppressed for brevity. The number of
observations for each full sample Eq. 1 regression is 126,708. The number of observations for all of the other full sample regressions is 121,379. The t-statistics,
derived using White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Without country or yearly dummies With full set of country and yearly dummies
Country/subperiod Number of obs Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Number of obs Eq. 3 Eq. 4
India 10518 -0.037 0.120** 3799 0.012 0.125*
(-1.48) (3.45) (0.30) (2.15)
Indonesia 9000 0.015 0.012 2598 -0.022 -0.003
(0.59) (0.44) (-0.61) (-0.08)
Korea 22538 0.108** 0.087** 8004 0.112** 0.105**
(6.98) (3.67) (5.07) (3.14)
Malaysia 24748 0.174** 0.156** 9636 0.197** 0.228**
(13.36) (10.27) (10.51) (9.12)
Philippines 8389 0.467** 0.445** 1206 0.469** 0.477**
(13.02) (11.99) (7.89) (5.48)
Singapore 19803 0.134** 0.130** 8765 0.137** 0.131**
(10.11) (8.20) (7.50) (5.47)
Taiwan 11417 0.165** 0.132** 2852 0.165** 0.107*
(7.21) (4.81) (4.29) (2.00)
Thailand 14966 0.000 -0.017 2245 -0.046 -0.031
(0.01) (-0.53) (-1.06) (-0.56)
1994-1997 42051 0.118** 0.071** 11767 0.132** 0.096**
(10.17) (5.47) (8.25) (4.56)
1998-2000 37467 0.117** 0.125** 13105 0.104** 0.126**
(9.94) (9.00) (6.28) (5.45)
2001-2003 41861 0.110** 0.112** 14233 0.103** 0.105**
(11.30) (9.06) (7.17) (5.22)
Panel A: Country by country regressions
Panel B: Subperiod by subperiod regressions
Table 4
Recommendation Optimism of Local versus Foreign Analysts by Country and Subperiod
Coefficient estimates on the local analyst dummy from country by country and subperiod by subperiod OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to
December 2003 across all analyst recommendation-firm observations in the sample at that time. The dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this
month's median recommendation. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the analysis. The recommendation
variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. The independent variables in Eq. 3 include local analyst dummy, log of firm size, analyst
experience in years, number of firms covered by analyst, and number of analysts covering firm. Eq. 4 includes, in addition, the independent variable number of
analysts in brokerage. The t -statistics, derived using White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5%
level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Full sample Matched sample
Panel A: Grouped by firm type
Coefficient on local analyst dummy in MSCI index Non-index Large Small Growth Value
Eq. 3 regression 0.120** 0.116** 0.133** 0.102** 0.101** 0.130**
(13.86) (13.03) (15.40) (11.37) (11.35) (13.88)
Eq. 4 regression 0.117** 0.095** 0.123** 0.093** 0.080** 0.131**
(11.27) (8.91) (11.80) (8.65) (7.44) (11.65)
Panel B: Grouped by brokerage type
Coefficient on local analyst dummy in Large Small Local presence No presence US Non-US
Eq. 3 regression 0.111** 0.148** 0.107** 0.129** 0.080** 0.124**
(12.25) (16.36) (15.30) (17.71) (9.07) (18.98)
Eq. 4 regression 0.172** 0.097** 0.095** 0.120** 0.050** 0.107**
(10.98) (8.93) (10.62) (12.35) (2.78) (13.77)
Firm type
All brokerage types Foreign brokerage type
Table 5
Recommendation Optimism of Local versus Foreign Analysts by Firm and Brokerage Type
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation-firm observations in samples broken down by firm and
brokerage type. The dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month's median recommendation. Observations with consensus generated with less than
three observations are excluded from the analysis. In the Eq. 3 regressions, the independent variables are the local analyst dummy, log of firm size, analyst experience,
number of analysts covering the firm, and number of firms covered by analyst. In the Eq. 4 regressions, the number of analysts working for the brokerage is also
included as an additional independent variable. The recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. Firms are split into groups
based on inclusion/non-inclusion in the MSCI Global World Free Index as of December 2003. Firm observations are also split into equal groups based on firm size and
on firm book-to-market ratio. Brokerages are split into small and large brokerages based on the number of analysts employed, such that the number of small and large
local brokerages are the same, and the number of small and large foreign brokerages are the same.  Foreign brokerages are also split into groups based on local presence
and whether they are based in the US. The t -statistics, derived using White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at
the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Recommendation level CAR[0] CAR[1,5] CAR[1,20] CAR[1,40] CAR[0] CAR[1,5] CAR[1,20] CAR[1,40] CAR[0] CAR[1,5] CAR[1,20] CAR[1,40]
Buy 0.23** 0.11 0.37** 0.76** 0.46** 0.68** 0.78** 1.08** 0.24** 0.58** 0.41** 0.32^
(5.43) (1.34) (3.11) (5.06) (10.21) (8.67) (11.27) (11.54) (3.82) (5.09) (2.96) (1.82)
Hold -0.26** -0.51** -0.82** -1.49** -0.18** 0.03 -0.19* -0.30** 0.08 0.54** 0.64** 1.18**
(-5.10) (-5.17) (-6.45) (-8.40) (-4.97) (0.36) (-2.28) (-2.96) (1.25) (4.37) (4.21) (5.62)
Sell -0.62** -0.93** -1.99** -2.96** -0.41** -0.29** -0.24 -0.81** 0.22* 0.64** 1.76** 2.15**
(-7.15) (-5.15) (-10.21) (-10.03) (-8.70) (-3.14) (-1.23) (-3.94) (2.18) (3.16) (6.38) (5.98)
Spread 0.85** 1.04** 2.37** 3.71** 0.87** 0.97** 1.02** 1.89** 1.09** 1.62** 2.78** 4.03**
(Buys - Sells) (8.80) (5.25) (10.33) (11.23) (13.36) (8.02) (4.95) (8.37) (11.06) (8.18) (13.38) (13.05)
Upgrade/Downgrade CAR[0] CAR[1,5] CAR[1,20] CAR[1,40] CAR[0] CAR[1,5] CAR[1,20] CAR[1,40] CAR[0] CAR[1,5] CAR[1,20] CAR[1,40]
Upgrade to buy 0.32** 0.15^ 0.71** 1.36** 0.55** 0.52** 1.23** 1.85** 0.23** 0.37** 0.52** 0.50^
(5.06) (1.81) (4.50) (5.82) (12.93) (10.62) (10.90) (11.90) (3.02) (3.89) (2.66) (1.78)
Downgrade to sell -0.74** -0.62** -1.33** -2.01** -0.52** -0.32** -0.37** -0.81** 0.22^ 0.30* 0.96** 1.20**
(-6.75) (-4.59) (-4.97) (-5.21) (-9.23) (-4.81) (-2.61) (-4.15) (1.79) (2.00) (3.18) (2.77)
Spread 1.06** 0.77** 2.04** 3.36** 1.07** 0.84** 1.60** 2.67** 1.29** 1.14** 2.56** 3.86**
(Upgrades - Downgrades) (8.38) (4.87) (6.57) (7.47) (15.16) (10.17) (8.86) (10.66) (10.97) (7.93) (8.82) (9.28)
Local analysts Foreign analysts  Foreign - Local
Local analysts Foreign analysts  Foreign - Local
Panel B: Upgrades and Downgrades
Table 6
Market-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns from Analyst Recommendations and Upgrades/Downgrades
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns in percentages are reported. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2003. CAR[0] denotes the cumulative
percentage abnormal returns from day 0, the day of the announcement. CAR [1,5] denotes the cumulative percentage abnormal returns from day 1 to day 5. CAR [1,20]
and CAR[1,40] are defined analogously. The spreads reported in the four rightmost columns of Panel A denote the CAR difference between a foreign buy and a local
sell. Those reported in the four rightmost columns of Panel B denote the CAR difference between a foreign upgrade and a local downgrade. In parentheses are the t
statistics. The t -test of the difference between the local and foreign analyst CARs allows for unequal variances. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the
5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Panel A: Recommendation levels
Raw return
CAPM Fama-French Four-factor model
Local 0.044* 0.020 0.017 0.018
(1.98) (0.91) (0.80) (0.81)
Foreign 0.048* 0.025 0.023 0.023
(2.52) (1.32) (1.23) (1.22)
Foreign - Local 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.51) (0.54) (0.64) (0.58)
Local 0.004 -0.019 -0.023 -0.021
(0.16) (-0.74) (-0.86) (-0.81)
Foreign 0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012
(0.64) (-0.54) (-0.69) (-0.63)
Foreign - Local 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.55) (0.57) (0.59) (0.58)
Local -0.039 -0.062* -0.066* -0.064*
(-1.45) (-2.36) (-2.52) (-2.44)
Foreign -0.005 -0.028 -0.032 -0.030
(-0.22) (-1.26) (-1.44) (-1.35)
Foreign - Local 0.034^ 0.034^ 0.034* 0.034^
(1.94) (1.94) (1.96) (1.93)
Local 0.052* 0.028 0.026 0.026
(2.22) (1.23) (1.11) (1.11)
Foreign 0.081** 0.058** 0.056** 0.056**
(4.09) (2.97) (2.88) (2.86)
Foreign - Local 0.029* 0.030* 0.030** 0.030**
(2.54) (2.57) (2.63) (2.60)
Local -0.081** -0.105** -0.108** -0.106**
(-3.15) (-4.11) (-4.27) (-4.17)
Foreign -0.028 -0.051* -0.055* -0.053*
(-1.22) (-2.27) (-2.46) (-2.36)
Foreign - Local 0.059** 0.060** 0.059** 0.059**
(3.75) (3.76) (3.76) (3.72)
Panel F: Long upgrade to buy,  short downgrade to sell
Long local upgrade,  short local downgrade 0.137** 0.137** 0.137** 0.136**
(11.38) (11.38) (11.42) (11.28)
Long foreign upgrade,  short foreign downgrade 0.109** 0.109** 0.110** 0.109**
(11.91) (11.86) (12.18) (11.93)
Long foreign upgrade,  short local downgrade 0.165** 0.165** 0.166** 0.164**
(10.31) (10.31) (10.39) (10.24)
Panel E: Downgrade to sell
Panel A: Buy recommendations
Panel B: Hold recommendations
Panel C: Sell recommendations
Panel D: Upgrade to buy
Table 7
Calendar Time Portfolio Analysis of Local and Foreign Analyst Recommendations
This table reports the average daily percentage buy and hold return/market-adjusted return/abnormal return for portfolios of
buy, hold, sell recommendations, as well as upgrades to buy and downgrades to sell. To obtain the CAPM abnormal return,
portfolio excess return is regressed on a constant and RMRF . To obtain the Fama-French abnormal return, portfolio excess
return is regressed on a constant, RMRF , SMB , and HML . To obtain the four-factor abnormal return, portfolio excess
return is regressed on a constant, RMRF , SMB , HML , and PR1YR . RMRF is the excess return on a value-weighted
aggregate market proxy, and SMB , HML , and PR1YR are returns on value-weighted, zero-investment, factor-mimicking
portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns. The sample period is from January
1994 to December 2003. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Abnormal return
Investor type Buy Hold Sell Buy Hold Sell Buy Hold Sell
Foreign investors 0.028* -0.007 -0.028 0.006 0.010 0.046* 0.057** -0.042 -0.127**
(2.01) (-0.45) (-1.52) (0.34) (0.56) (2.08) (2.75) (-1.59) (-3.93)
Local institutions 0.051** -0.050** -0.043^ 0.065** -0.062** -0.044 0.033 -0.026 -0.043
(3.30) (-3.03) (-1.87) (3.05) (-3.02) (-1.45) (1.46) (-0.92) (-1.18)
Local retail investors -0.048** 0.034^ 0.087** -0.024 0.016 0.061^ -0.081** 0.071* 0.122**
(-2.95) (1.88) (3.28) (-1.08) (0.75) (1.71) (-3.39) (2.32) (3.06)
Investor type Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade
Foreign investors 0.042^ -0.070* 0.009 0.041 0.094** -0.165**
(1.91) (-2.40) (0.34) (1.00) (2.61) (-4.03)
Local institutions 0.079** -0.074* 0.074* -0.092^ 0.088* -0.058
(3.25) (-2.11) (2.33) (-1.77) (2.30) (-1.23)
Local retail investors -0.058* 0.147** -0.009 0.119* -0.135** 0.172**
(-2.29) (3.78) (-0.29) (2.01) (-3.42) (3.31)
Panel B:  Coefficient estimates on upgrade/downgrade dummies in regression on standardized trade imbalance
All analysts Local analysts Foreign analysts
Panel A: Coefficient estimates on buy/hold/sell dummies in regression on standardized trade imbalance
All analysts Local analysts Foreign analysts
Table 8
Trade Reaction to Analyst Recommendations by Investor Type
This table reports the trade reaction for Korean stocks (Korean stock exchange) grouped by investor type and analyst recommendation type from day 0 to day 1
inclusive, where day 0 denotes the day of the recommendation. Investor types include foreign investors, local institutions, and local retail investors. Panel A reports
the coefficient estimates on the buy, hold, and sell dummies when standardized trade imbalance is regressed on the buy, hold, and sell dummies. The regressions are
estimated separately for each investor type. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates on the upgrade and downgrade dummies when standardized trade imbalance is
regressed on the upgrade and downgrade dummies. Upgrades denote upgrades to buy. Downgrades denote downgrades to sell. As in Panel A, the regressions are
estimated separately for each investor type. Trade imbalance is net buys divided by total buys and sells. Standardized trade imbalance is trade imbalance minus
mean trade imbalance divided by standard deviation of trade imbalance, where the mean and standard deviation are calculated over the year for each firm and
investor type. The t -statistics, derived using White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses.  ^ = significant at the 10% level;  * = significant at the 5% level; ** =
significant at the 1% level.
Independent variable
Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 3 Eq. 4
Local analyst dummy 0.117** 0.108** 0.118** 0.109** 0.117** 0.106** 0.115** 0.105**
(14.07) (10.82) (14.11) (10.84) (13.95) (10.59) (13.79) (10.39)
Past affiliation dummy (<= 1 year post IPO/SEO) 0.057^ 0.060^
(1.65) (1.72)
Past affiliation dummy (<= 2 years post IPO/SEO) 0.008 0.010
(0.31) (0.40)
Past affiliation dummy (<= 5 years post IPO/SEO) 0.036^ 0.039*
(1.91) (2.04)
Past affiliation dummy (<= ∞ years post IPO/SEO) 0.050** 0.053**
(3.05) (3.21)
Future affiliation dummy (<= 1 year pre IPO/SEO) 0.120** 0.123**
(2.80) (2.86)
Future affiliation dummy (<= 2 years pre IPO/SEO) 0.102** 0.105**
(3.11) (3.19)
Future affiliation dummy (<= 5 years pre IPO/SEO) 0.088** 0.091**
(3.41) (3.53)
Future affiliation dummy (<= ∞ years pre IPO/SEO) 0.075** 0.078**
(3.14) (3.27)
Augmented with affiliation dummies
Table 9
Regressions on Analyst Recommendation Optimism Controlling for Underwriter Affiliation 
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation-firm observations in the sample at that time. The
dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month's median recommendation. In the augmented Eq. 3 regressions, the independent variables are the local
analyst dummy, the past affiliation dummy, the future affiliation dummy, the log of firm size, the number of firms covered by the analyst, the number of analysts
covering the firm, the experience level in years of the analyst, and the full set of country and year dummies. In the augmented Eq. 4 regressions, the number of analysts
employed by the brokerage is also included among the regressors. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the
analysis. Firms without IPO/SEO lead underwriter information are also excluded from the analysis. The analysis includes both domestic and international issues. The
recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. The past affiliation dummy (<=1 year post IPO/SEO) takes a value of 1 if the
analyst belongs to a brokerage that was the lead or joint lead manager for the firm's IPO or SEO not more than a year ago. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. The other affil-
iation dummies are defined analogously. The future affiliation dummy (<=1 year pre IPO/SEO) takes a value of 1 if the analyst belongs to a brokerage that will be the
lead or joint lead manager for the firm's IPO or SEO not more than a year in the future. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. The other future affiliation dummies are defined
analogously. Only the coefficients on the local analyst dummy and the affiliation dummies are reported for brevity. The number of observations for each regression is
64,537. The t -statistics, derived using White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant
at the 1% level.
Independent variable
Local analyst dummy 0.095** 0.059** 0.071** 0.056** 0.031^ 0.080** 0.027 0.014
(6.26) (3.99) (4.15) (3.12) (1.75) (4.64) (1.57) (0.64)
Past affiliation dummy (<= ∞ years post IPO/SEO) 0.053** 0.052** 0.050** 0.051** 0.050** 0.052** 0.050** 0.049**
(3.19) (3.12) (3.02) (3.11) (3.03) (3.13) (3.00) (2.97)
Future affiliation dummy (<= ∞ years pre IPO/SEO) 0.078** 0.075** 0.076** 0.075** 0.073** 0.078** 0.072** 0.072**
(3.27) (3.13) (3.17) (3.13) (3.06) (3.24) (3.02) (3.01)
Local analyst dummy * total number of issues in firm ctry (Y-1) -0.016 -0.009 0.003
(-1.17) (-0.51) (0.18)
Local analyst dummy * total number of issues in firm ctry (Y) 0.015 0.007 -0.010 -0.029
(0.94) (0.42) (-0.39) (-1.12)
Local analyst dummy * total number of issues in firm ctry (Y+1) 0.036* 0.052** 0.047*
(2.34) (2.62) (2.36)
Proportion of issues underwritten by brokerages in analyst ctry (Y-1) 0.077** 0.028 0.020
(3.95) (1.28) (0.90)
Proportion of issues underwritten by brokerages in analyst ctry (Y) 0.082** 0.081** 0.046* 0.048*
(4.20) (4.10) (2.06) (2.15)
Proportion of issues underwritten by brokerages in analyst ctry (Y+1) 0.092** 0.070** 0.069**
(4.70) (3.20) (3.00)
Eq. 4 augmented with affiliation dummies and investment banking proxies
Table 10
Sensitivity of Recommendation Optimism to International Investment Banking Proxies
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation-firm observations in the sample at that time. The
dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month's median recommendation. The independent variables are the local analyst dummy, the past affiliation
dummy, the future affiliation dummy, the local analyst dummy interacted with the number of issues in the firm's country in a year (in thousands), the proportion of
equity issues underwritten by brokerages headquartered in the same country as the analyst's brokerage, the log of firm size, the number of firms covered by the analyst,
the number of analysts covering the firm, the experience level in years of the analyst, the number of analysts employed by the brokerage, and the full set of country and
year dummies. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the analysis. Firms without IPO/SEO lead underwriter
information are also excluded from the analysis. The analysis includes both domestic and international issues. The recommendation variable takes the following values:
3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. The past affiliation dummy takes a value of 1 if the analyst belongs to a brokerage that was the lead or joint lead manager for the firm's
IPO or SEO. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. The future affiliation dummy takes a value of 1 if the analyst belongs to a brokerage that will be the lead or joint lead
manager for the firm's IPO or SEO. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. Only the coefficients on the local analyst dummy, the affiliation dummies, and the investment
banking variables are reported for brevity. The number of observations for each regression is 64,537. The t -statistics, derived using White (1980) standard errors, are in
parentheses. ^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Country No. of issues cap (US$bn) % (number) % (market cap) % (number) % (market cap)
India 1166 3.43 97.43 90.82 2.57 9.18
Indonesia 212 3.95 78.77 69.67 21.23 30.34
Korea 881 51.23 96.37 95.61 3.29 4.29
Malaysia 946 14.49 97.67 96.65 2.22 3.31
Philippines 122 2.86 87.71 86.18 12.30 13.82
Singapore 564 10.82 80.85 72.82 18.97 26.97
Taiwan 501 18.69 98.80 99.78 1.20 0.22
Thailand 136 4.75 94.85 95.24 5.15 4.76
Appendix: Table A1
Equity Issues in Emerging Markets
This table shows the number of domestic equity issues for the eight emerging countries that we study. The sample
period is from January 1994 to December 2003. Lead underwriters are classified into local and foreign based on
the locations of their head offices. Only equity issues with underwriter information are included in the sample.
Equity issues are classified as "local lead underwriter" issues if the sole managing underwriter is local or if there
are no foreign underwriters among the joint managing underwriters. All other issues are classified as "foreign lead
underwriter" issues. 
Total equity issue market Local lead underwriters Foreign lead underwriters
